Stepping Up To The Global Environmental Challenge by Esty, Daniel C
Fordham Environmental Law Review
Volume 8, Number 1 2011 Article 10
Stepping Up To The Global Environmental
Challenge
Daniel C. Esty∗
∗
Copyright c©2011 by the authors. Fordham Environmental Law Review is produced by The
Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr
STEPPING UP TO THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE
Daniel C. Esty"
Environmental policy has come a long way over the last century.
rom its origins in the conservation movement of John Muir,
Gifford Pinchot, and Theodore Roosevelt, our efforts at
environmental protection have flowered into a diverse and broad set
of programs aimed at a variety of pollution and resource problems.
But while we have developed quite elaborate structures for
addressing public health and ecological harms at the local, state,
and federal levels, we have done relatively little in the way of an
institutional response to problems that arise at the international
level. Therefore, the most important issue facing the environmental
world on the brink of the twenty-first century is the need to
develop coherent strategies and mechanisms to combat
transboundary environmental threats which range from pollution in
rivers shared across borders to acid rain, ozone layer depletion, and
climate change.
Globalization actually presents three distinct environmental
challenges. First, we must come to grips with a set of harms that
inherently span multiple countries or even the entire planet and
cannot be addressed successfully with environmental programs
defined at the national level. This might be called the challenge of
ecological interdependence. Second, unless managed appropriately,
trade liberalization and the globalization of the world economy will
create competitiveness pressures that undermine country-level
environmental policies. These tensions, arising from environmental
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standards that vary across jurisdictions, can be seen as the
environmental dimension of the challenge of economic interdepen-
dence. Third, as the result of the emergence of an international
"civil society," policymakers face new public demands for envi-
ronmental action arising at the level of the global community - a
challenge of ecological identity.
This Essay offers a description of these environmental challenges.
It recounts the failure of past and present policies to address these
concerns adequately and concludes with a call for the development
of a new international environmental regime in response.
THREE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES
National policies, no matter how good, cannot achieve success in
combating threats to the "global commons." Even if, for example,
the United States were to eliminate all production and use of
chlorofluorocarbons ("CFC"s) and other chemicals harmful to the
ozone layer, as long as other countries fail to control their CFC
releases, the ozone layer will continue to thin. Because the deleteri-
ous effects of CFCs spread relatively evenly across the entire plan-
et, the anticipated adverse impacts, from increased cases of skin
cancer to reduced agricultural production, will still be felt in the
United States as well as other countries that are doing the "right
thing" by reducing emissions. We also now recognize the risk
posed by regional pollution spillovers or "externalities." The Dan-
ube River winds its way through seven countries on its way to the
ocean. Those upriver profoundly shape the quality of the water
downriver. If upriver countries fail to impose adequate pollution
controls, downriver people pay the price. Similarly, coal burning,
with its attendant sulfur dioxide emissions, creates acid rain that
drifts from the United States into Canada, from Poland into Swe-
den, and from China into Japan.'
1. See, e.g., JURGEN SCHMANDT ET AL., ACID RAIN AND FRIENDLY NEIGH-
BORS: THE POLICY DISPUTE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (re-
vised ed. 1988); GREGORY S. WETSTONE & ARMIN ROSENCRANZ, ACID RAIN IN
EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA: NATIONAL RESPONSES TO AN INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEM 52 (1983) (tracing acid deposition in Sweden to European countries
including Poland); Hilary E. MacGregor, Clearing the Air with a Neighbor. Ja-
pan is Spending Big on Technology to Improve China's Environment, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1995, at D1.
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The need for an overarching sovereign to respond to the collec-
tive action problem posed by pollution harms that cross jurisdic-
tional boundaries has been understood for more than a century.'
Yet these global and transboundary environmental threats persist
because there is no government with the requisite breadth of au-
thority to impose effective and equitable responses on the violators.
Absent an environmental policymaker who takes into account all of
the beneficiaries and cost-bearers from prospective pollution policy
interventions, optimal results are unlikely to be achieved.3
Whether nations will find cooperative solutions to transboundary
problems depends on: (1) the distribution of costs and benefits from
action (or inaction); and (2) the strength of common environmental
and legal norms. Where harms are identifiable and reciprocal - for
example, if the wind blows from the east on some days and from
the west on other days - countries may recognize their interdepen-
dence and agree on coordinated national programs of environmental
protection.4 But cooperative policies are unlikely to succeed in
circumstances where this reciprocity is not present. Upriver juris-
dictions do not clean up fully the pollution they cause because
much of the harm falls on "outsiders" downstream. Similarly, Chi-
nese officials know that, given prevailing winds, a considerable
portion of the acid rain damage from new Chinese power plants
falls beyond the Chinese border.5 This meteorological fact causes
China to systematically under-attend to its sulfur dioxide emissions.6
2. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Viking Penguin 1982) (1859).
3. See, e.g., John B. Braden, The Economics of Environmental Policy-making
in a Multi-layer Government Structure, in RECENT ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DE-
VELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 49-74 (Filip Abraham et al.
eds., 1995); see also Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95
MICH. L. REv. 570 (1996) (discussing this jurisdictional problem as a "structural
failure").
4. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EvOLUTION
OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (discussing the circumstances
that produce cooperative action); MAKING THE COMMONS WORK: THEORETICAL,
HISTORICAL, AND CONTEMPORARY STUDIES (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1992).
5. See, e.g., MacGregor, supra note 1; Charles A. Radin, With China's Mira-
cle Pollution Surges, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 2, 1995, at 47; Sheila Tefft, Rush to
Burn Coal Turns China into Asia's Polluter, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 30,
1995, at 1.
6. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 5 (reporting that Chinese officials "bristle at
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Nor will collaboration emerge if the causes of harm or its effects
are unclear or disputed. As long as the United States persisted with
the view that the death of Canadian lakes and forests had nothing
to do with U.S. coal burning, no agreement on acid rain controls
was possible.7 Furthermore, if ownership of the relevant "property
rights"8 is indeterminate, further problems emerge. China, for ex-
ample, rejects Japan's entreaties to control its acid rain not so much
because the source of harm is in doubt but because it claims a right
to pollute and insists that the richer country should pay for any
clean-up efforts.9
Unless these pitfalls can be avoided and the "transaction costs" of
negotiating and maintaining agreement on a common policy are
low, the chances of obtaining effective national responses to inter-
national environmental problems are limited."° In these circum-
stances, the lack of international capacity to enforce environmental
protection norms means the polluting nations carry on with impuni-
ty. It is left up to the victims to pay for any controls that are to be
undertaken. In particular, the absence of an overarching authority
means that polluting nations persistently violate the Polluter Pays
Principle." Rather than holding polluters responsible for the harms
suggestions from other countries that China should take drastic conservation steps
at its own expense").
7. See SCHMANDT ET AL., supra note 1, at 73-75 (chronicling the difficulties
in U.S.-Canadian acid rain negotiations and attributing much of the "impasse" to
scientific disagreement).
8. As discussed in this context, the conflict over "property rights" reflects the
tension between one party's right to dispose of her property as she pleases, with
another party's right to not be injured by that choice. In most domestic circum-
stances, who holds the rights is well established by the common law of nuisance
or by statute. In the international setting, however, who holds the rights may be
less clear. For a more detailed discussion of this conflict, see Esty, supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 5; Tefft, supra note 5; MacGregor, supra note
1.
10. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960) (demonstrating that efficient agreements can be negotiated if transaction
costs are low); see also Esty, supra note 3 (discussing the need to have a mecha-
nism to enforce agreements as well).
11. The "Polluter Pays Principle" holds that polluters should bear the costs of
their pollution. Many economists and environmentalists see such cost
"internalization" as the appropriate approach to resolving environmental disputes.
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF
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they cause, which is the fundamental legal principle of the common
law of nuisance and of most regulatory systems, the rule in interna-
tional environmental law has become, by default, let pollution
harms fall where they may. This effectively lodges the property
rights with polluters, instead of with those who seek to be free of
pollution.'2
From a perspective of naked self-interest, this lodging of rights
with polluters has served U.S. interests. To date, the United States
has caused much more transboundary pollution harm than it has
suffered. But the U.S. position, as a net polluter, appears likely to
change in the very near future. Indeed, the growing economies of
the developing world are shifting the balance of polluting activities
away from the traditional industrial powers such as the United
States. By early in the next century, for example, China will sur-
pass the United States as the world's leading emitter of greenhouse
gases.'3 As the environmental shoe shifts to the other foot, the
United States will find that it has a much greater interest in estab-
lishing and enforcing the Polluter Pays Principle as the foundation
for international environmental law.
The rise of developing economies leads as well to the second key
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed. 1988). See also Daniel Bodansky, Customary
(And Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 105, 110-11 (1995) (observing that, despite the omnipresent Pollut-
er Pays Principle, transboundary pollution is the rule not the exception); DANIEL
C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 38
(1994); PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRE BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND
NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW
198 (1996); AGENDA 21 . .. EARTH SUMMIT-UNrrED NATIONS PROGRAM OF
ACTION FROM Rio, U.N. Doc. AIConf.151/5, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.11 (1993)
[hereinafter Rio DECLARATION].
12. For example, although Japan should enjoy the right to be free from Chi-
nese sulfur dioxide pollution, it currently is forced to discourage pollution
through a "Green Aid" program which subsidizes improved pollution controls
within China. See Peter Evans, Japan's Green Aid: Tokyo Has Taken the Lead in
Introducing Environmental Technologies in China, CHINA Bus. REV. (July 1,
1994) at 39-43; MacGregor, supra note 1.
13. See Daniel C. Esty & Robert Mendelsohn, Powering China: Envi-
ronmental Implications of China's Economic Development, Yale Center for Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy (May 1995) (unpublished study, on file with the au-
thors).
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trend that shapes our international environmental future. Notably,
we are increasingly part of a globalized economy. Even the United
States, traditionally not a particularly large participant in trade be-
cause of its extensive domestic market, now has almost a quarter of
its Gross Domestic Product moving as imports or exports.1 4 More-
over, much of the U.S. job growth that has been generated in the
last decade has been in export-oriented industries. 5
The need to maintain the path toward trade liberalization and the
economic benefits that it promises creates a whole new set of envi-
ronmental policy tensions. In particular, one of the core elements of
most trade agreements is a commitment to provide other countries
with "market access."'6 This can sometimes mean that national
regulatory programs come under attack as barriers to free trade. 7
Striking an appropriate trade and environmental policy balance that
protects legitimate environmental programs but does not permit
programs that unfairly discriminate against foreign-produced goods
requires a careful mix of thoughtful national policymaking and
attentive international oversight.
Economic interdependence can also create competitiveness ten-
sions that may make it difficult for countries with high standards to
maintain their environmental programs. In particular, faced with
competition from low-cost producers in other countries with less
demanding environmental requirements, industries may lobby to
have their pollution control requirements relaxed. While there is
little evidence that this "race toward the bottom" results in any
mass business migration to "pollution havens,"'8 there is consider-
14. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Int'l Trade in Goods & Services, U.S.
Doc. FI-900 (Sept. 1996).
15. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, Is the U.S. Souring on Free Trade?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1996, at D1 (reporting that in the last four years, exports have grown
31%, creating 1,000,000 new jobs).
16. See, e.g., LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON
TRADE WITHIN THE EEC (1985); PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (3d ed. 1996); The North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 8, 11, 14, 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., ch. 7B, 9, 32 I.L.M. 289.
17. See, e.g., ESTY, supra note 11, at 44-46.
18. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. LEONARD, POLLUTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
WORLD PRODUCT (1988); Joseph Kalt, The Impact of Domestic Environmental
Regulatory Policies on U.S. Competitiveness, in INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVE-
NESS (Michael Spence & Heather Hazard eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988);
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able anecdotal evidence that the threat of competitive disadvantage
affects the environmental policymaking dynamic. 9 The Clinton
Administration's effort to introduce a BTU (energy) tax in 1993
collapsed when energy-intensive industries complained that they
would be disadvantaged in the global marketplace."0 Similarly, the
European Union has not moved forward on new energy taxes be-
cause of a fear of lost competitiveness.2 Thus, mechanisms must
be developed to ensure that international competition does not play
out in the form of inappropriate pressures on environmental stan-
dards.22
Finally, the public's perception, both in the United States and
elsewhere, of its own interest and identity is globalizing. News
travels far and fast. Television makes distant harms seem palpable.
More people vacation or work abroad - or know someone who
does. New forms of communication from cheap overseas telephone
calls to the Internet link people across national boundaries as never
before. The distinction between "us" and "them" is blurring.
We are witnessing, moreover, the emergence of a vast number of
transnational non-governmental organizations ("NGO"s) that repre-
sent people with common interests across many countries. The
World Wildlife Fund, for example, operates in more than a hundred
countries and increasingly seeks to shape international politics as
well as decisionmaking at the national level. Efforts to preserve
Patrick Low & Alexander Yeats, Do Dirty Industries Migrate?, in INTERNATION-
AL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Patrick Low, ed., 1992, World Bank Discus-
sion Paper 159).
19. See JOHNSON & BEAULIEU, supra note 11, at 43-47.
20. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Energy Tax Plan to be Scaled Back,
Moynihan Reports, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1993, at 1; Steven Greenhouse, Clinton
Says He Has Made No Decision on Energy Tax, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1993, at
D1.
21. See, e.g., ESC Adopts Opinion on CO2 lEnergy Tax, THE REUTER EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY REP., Apr. 5, 1996, available in LEXIS, World Library,
AllNews File.
22. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (arguing that interjurisdictional competition over
environmental standards is not only appropriate but beneficial); but see Esty,
supra note 3 (refuting Revesz's claim and demonstrating why regulatory competi-
tion in the environmental realm is likely to yield sub-optimal results).
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African elephants, Brazilian rain forests, and Pacific coral reefs
transcend national boundaries, and the people who worry about the
loss of these resources view themselves as part of a global commu-
nity. Their interest in environmental protection may not be ade-
quately met with programs exclusively at the nation-state level.
THE FAILURE OF PAST POLICIES
The 1992 Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro presented an opportu-
nity to develop new mechanisms for responding to globalization in
the environmental domain. World leaders failed to seize the mo-
ment. Although the theme of "sustainable development" emerged,
no consensus developed on how this concept might play out in
practice. In particular, very little progress was made in bridging the
North-South gap that separates countries that perceive environmen-
tal policy to be an essential component of the quality of life they
seek to provide for their people from those that view public health
and ecological protection as a worthy goal but one which they
cannot yet afford given their modest state of development.23
The opportunity at Rio for institutional reform also slipped away.
In large part because of opposition from the United States, efforts
to restructure and reposition the international environmental regime
to improve its ability to address transboundary and global harms
did not go forward. Efforts, for example, to consolidate the United
Nations Environment Program ("UNEP") and the United Nations
Development Program ("UNDP") were turned aside.24
Instead, the participants in the U.N. Conference on Environment
and Development, as the Earth Summit was officially called, agreed
to create a new Commission on Sustainable Development
("CSD").2 This new U.N. entity has proven to be entirely incapa-
23. See RIO DECLARATION, supra note 11.
24. RICHARD N. GARDNER, NEGOTIATING SuRVIvAL: FOUR PRIORrrIEs AFrER
Rio (1992); Daniel C. Esty, Turning the Giant's Head, in ECODECISION
(September 1993).
25. See, e.g., Anthony Carroll & Jill Rhodes, ASIL UN Observers' Reports:
Commission on Sustainable Development, AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL. (Am.
Soc'y Int'l Law), Mar. 1994, available in LEXIS, International Law Library,
IntLR File. See also S. Jacob Scherr & Jared E. Blumenfeld, Implementing
UNCED, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 227, 236-41 (Philippe Sands ed.,
1994).
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ble of addressing international environmental challenges. The
CSD's charge is too sweeping. To be told to follow through on
"Agenda 21," the 700-page compendium of all environmental prob-
lems compiled at the Earth Summit, is a bit like being told to fol-
low through on the Bible. The CSD further suffers from a lack of
political support from the nations of the world, an inadequate bud-
get, and competition for jurisdiction over environmental issues with
UNEP, UNDP, and half a dozen other U.N. bodies, as well as the
secretariats to the many environmental treaties that have been con-
cluded in the last few years. In short, we are attempting to respond
to global environmental problems with a jumble of inadequate and
uncoordinated institutions.
THE NEED FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME
The need for improved global environmental governance is clear.
It is also clear that improved governance need not mean world gov-
ernment. A better international environmental regime need not be a
bigger one. An effective and efficient response to transboundary
and global environmental problems will require some institutional
restructuring and perhaps the creation of a Global Environmental
Organization ("GEO"). A GEO could be fashioned from the con-
solidation and elimination of six or seven of the U.N. bodies that
now address various aspects of the environment. It should be lean,
flexible, and focussed on the specific challenges presented by inter-
national environmental problems.
By providing a single mechanism for addressing transboundary
harms, a GEO would help to ensure that worldwide policy interven-
tions are both cost-effective and environmentally effective. With
appropriate (narrowly-tailored) authority, a GEO could discipline
"free-riders" that threaten to disrupt successful collective action by
the world community in response to international public health and
ecological threats. A GEO might also provide a forum for the ex-
change of data, information, and policy analysis with regard to the
wide range of national-scale but "common" problems that environ-
mental policymakers face around the world. Given the technical
complexity, science-intensity, and resulting analytic scale econo-
mies of many environmental problems, this sort of exchange of
information is likely to yield benefits for all.
A GEO would also facilitate trade liberalization and economic
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integration. Specifically, a GEO provides a mechanism for coordi-
nating regulatory policies so as to avoid competitiveness-driven
races toward the bottom. It would also allow for some convergence
of environmental standards across countries at similar levels of
development. Such convergence would facilitate business access to
overseas markets by ensuring that only a single standard needs to
be met. It would also enhance environmental policy administration
by permitting jurisdictions to draw on each other's experiences,
technologies, and training programs.
Of course, there are many people who find the performance of
the current U.N. system to be so faulty that they dare not add a
new organization to the U.N. structure.26 But the existence of
poorly functioning U.N. bodies offers no real argument against
creation of a GEO. To the contrary, dysfunctional parts of the U.N.
system should be disbanded to make room for new structures of
international governance in areas that were not previously recog-
nized, such as the environment. No matter how much one stresses
the potential for making a new environmental body a small and
efficient organization - perhaps even a "virtual" organization in
many respects - with a tightly-defined mission and set of authori-
ties, fears of lost national sovereignty are likely to be advanced as a
reason not to proceed. But this complaint also holds no water.
Ecological interdependence is inescapable. The fact of our shared
biosphere makes the issue not whether to have an international
environmental policy mechanism, but what sort of institution to
have. In this context, the logic of a GEO becomes overwhelming.
Simply put, we cannot protect the American public from ecological
threats acting alone. To gain control over our environmental
destiny, we must cooperate and coordinate with others.
The need to manage the regulatory tensions arising from a global
marketplace and the demands of an international civil society adds
to the case for a revitalized international environmental manage-
ment structure. Again, the issue is not whether these pressures will
exist but whether we create a functioning regime to respond explic-
26. See Daniel C. Esty, The Case for a Global Environmental Organization,
in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY: FIFrY YEARS AFrER BRETrON WOODS
287 (Peter B. Kenen ed., 1994) (assessing the arguments for and against a new
international environmental body).
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itly, systematically, and coherently or persist with an indirect, ad
hoc, and inefficient patchwork of national environmental programs.
History offers numerous examples of what happens when interna-
tional institutions fail to meet global challenges. Indeed, it took the
calamities of the Great Depression and World War II to awaken the
world community to its economic interdependence and the necessity
of mechanisms such as the World Bank and the Global Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade to facilitate international economic coopera-
tion. Let us hope it does not take a comparable environmental crisis
to bring the world's leaders face-to-face with the need to manage
their interdependence in the face of globalized environmental chal-
lenges.

